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MORTGAGES-MORTGAGEE IN POSSESSION-ACQUIRING TITLE
BY ADVERSE PossEssIoN.-A recent case in South Carolina held,
under a vigorous dissent, that a mortgagor was not barred by ad-
verse possession from redeeming his land twenty years after he
had surrendered possession to the mortgagee in payment of the
debt.? The decision is of interest in that it calls attention to the
rights and liabilities of a mortgagee in possession.
A mortgagee in possession is generally defined as one- who
has possession under his mortgage lawfully and with the consent,
express or implied, of the mortgagor.' Thus the mortgagee may
'Frady v. Ivester, (S.C. 1921) iio S. E. 135.29 R. C. L. 327; 2 Jones, Mortgages, 7th Ed., sec. 702.
NOTES
enter into possession under an agreement to collect the rents and
profits to apply on the mortgage debt as an additional security for
the debt.' And a mortgagee or purchaser entering by virtue of
a defective foreclosure sale is considered a mortgagee in posses-
sion." Some courts hold that the possession need not be taken
with the consent of the mortgagor, if it is peaceably and legally
taken.' A mortgagee in possession cannot be ejected until the
debt is paid.' He is accountable for 'the fair rental value of the
property determined on its condition at the time he entered, but
he can apply the rents and profits in payment of the mortgage
debt.' He can not make unnecessary improvements on the land
except at his own risk, since he can not demand payment for them
upon redemption!
After a mortgagee has been in possession for a length of time
shfficient to bar ordinary rights, the question arises whether the
right of redemption is barred, giving the mortgagee an absolute
title. Where the mortgagee enters under an agreement with the
mortgagor, i. e., where the possession is permissive and in re-
cognition of the right of redemption, the statute of limitations
'Longfellow v. Fisher, (1897) 69 Minn. 307, 72 N. W. ii8; Catlin v.
Murray, (1905) 37 Wash. 164, 79 Pac. 6o5.
'Russell v. H. C. Alceley Lumber Co., (18gi) 45 Minn. 376, 48 N. W.
3; Haggart v. Wilczinski, (i9o6) 143 Fed. 22, 26, 74 C. C. A. 176. One
who takes possession under a conveyance from a purchaser at a void
foreclosure sale is a mortgagee in possession, Kaylor v. Kelsey, (1912)
9i Neb. 404, 136 N. W. 54, 4o L. R. A. (N.S.) 839 and note: New York,
however, does not allow a third person who has entered as purchaser under
a void foreclosure sale the rights of a mortgagee in possession, Shriver v.
Shriver, (1881) 86 N. Y. 575, 581. And Michigan perxnits the mortgagor
to eject the mortgagee who is in possession by virtue of a void fore-
closure, Bowen v. Brogan, (1899) 11g Mich. 218, 77 N. W. 942, 7q A. S. R.
387Jaggar v. Plunkett, (191o) 81 Kan. 565, io6 Pac. 280; Investment
Securities Co. v. Adams, (9o5) 37 Wash. 211, 216, 79 Pac. 625. Backus
v. Burke, (1895) 63 Minn. 272, 277, 65 N. W. 459, holds that a purchaser
entering under void foreclosure proceedings is a mortgagee in possession
regardless of the consent of the mortgagor. This is squarely opposed to
the view expressed in the earlier case of Rogers v. Benton, (1888) 39
Minn. 39, 44, 38 N. W. 765, 12 A. S. R. 613, to the effect that the consent
of the mortgagor, express or implied, is the essence of "a mortgagee in
possession."
'Stouffer v. Harlan, (i9o3) 68 Kan. 135, 146, 74 Pac. 61o, 64 L. R. A.
320, -1o4 A. S. R. 396; 2 Jones, Mortgages, 7th Ed,, sec. 674; see also
Becker jr. McCrea, (19o8) 193 N. Y. 423, 428, 86 N. E. 463, 23 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 754 and note.
"Anderson v. Minnesota Loan & Trust Co., (i897) 68 Minn. 491, 71
N. W. 665; Grannis v. Hitchcock, (1912) z18 Minn. 462, 137 N. W. x86;
Bowen v. Boughner, (192o) 189 Ky. 107, 113, 224 S. W. 653; 2 Jones,
Mortgages, 7th Ed., sec. 1114.
'Bowen v. Boughner, (192o) 189 Ky. 107, 224 S. W. 653; 2 Jones.
Mortgages, 7th Ed., sec. 1127.
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will not begin to run until the mortgagee disavows the right of re-
demption by some act giving notice of his adverse claim to the
mortgagor.' It is assumed that there can be no adverse holding
so long as the mortgage relation continues," but a strict applica-
tion of this rule leaves the mortgagee in this disadvantageous
position. He can not sell the land, since he cannot give an in-
defeasible title, nor make permanent improvements, rendering it
profitable for the mortgagor to redeem, yet in many cases his
right to foreclose is barred by the statutory period and if he de-
clares an adverse intent he becomes a mere trespasser, liable to an
action of ejectment." California circumvents this difficulty by al-
lowing the mortgagee in possession a prescriptive title in five
years after his right to foreclose is barred.' Other jurisdictions
hold that no affirmative showing of an adverse intent is necessary,
that mere possession by the mortgagee for twenty years without
an accounting or active admission of the mortgage relation is suf-
ficient to cut off the right of redemption!' Another view is based
on the theory that the rights of the mortgagor and mortgagee
are reciprocal, with the result. that the right to redeem is barred
when the statute cuts off the right to foreclose."
A different situation is presented where the mortgagee takes
possession under a void foreclosure sale. Here, according to the
view of the Minnesota court, the mortgagee's possession is ad-
verse from the beginning and his entry starts the statute of limi-
tations running in his favor.' Since the mortgagee is entitled to
'Becker v. McCrea, (i9o8) 193 N. Y. 423, 429, 86 N. E..463, 23 L. R.
A. (N S.) 754; Blessett v. Turcotte, (1912) 23 N. D. 417, 425, 136 N. W.
945; Frady v. Ivester," (S.C. 1921) Iio S. E. 135; West v. Banking Co.
et al., (1914) 33 S. D. 465, 485, 146 N. WA. 598; 2 Jones, Mortgages, 7th
Ed., sec. 1152.
"2 Jones, Mortgages, 7th Ed., sec. 1152; Catlin v. Murray, (1905) 37
Wash. 164, 79 Pac. 6o5.
"Backuis v. Burke, (1895) 63 Minn. 272, 279, 65 N. W. 459; Cory v.
Santa Ynez Land, etc., Co., (19o7) 151 Cal. 778, 782, 91 Pac. 647.
12Cory v. Santa Ynez Land, etc., Co., (19o7) 151 Cal. 778, 783, 91 Pac.
647. The mortgagee can bring an action in equity to compel redemption
if he desires, Jaggar v. Plunkett, (igio)" 8I Kan. 565, io6 Pac. 280.
'Batchelder v. Bickford, (I918) 117 Me. 468, lO4 Atl. 8ig; see also
Dixon v. Hayes, (911) 171 Ala. 498, 55 So. 164.
"Haskell v. Bailey, (1853) 22 Conn. 569, 573; Adams v. Holden, (igoo)
iii Ia. 54, 6o, 82 N. W. 468; Brown v. Berry, (I918) 89 N. J. Eq. 230,
io8 Atl. 51; 2 Jones, Mortgages, 7th Ed., sec. 1146. See Bradley v. Norris,(I895) 63 Minn. 156, 165, 65 N. W. 357.
"Backus v. Burke, (1895) 63 Minn. 272, 279, 65 N. W. 459; Nash v.
Land Co., (i9o6) 15 N. D. 566, .574, io8 N. W. 792. Rigney v. De Graw,
(igoo) ioo Fed. 213, cited in 2 Jones, Mortgages, 7th Ed., sec. 1152 as
authority for the contrary view was reversed on appeal in Stout v. Rigney,
(1901) 107 Fed. 545, 549, 46 C. C. A. 459.
NOTES
possession, the consent of the mortgagor is unimportant and is
nothing more than acquiescence in the adverse holding. It
should be noted, however, that one who enters under a void fore-
closure but before receiving a deed acquires the status of a mort-
gagee in possession only by virtue of the consent of the mort-
gagor. Accordingly the statute does not begin to run until the
mortgagee disavows the mortgage relation by some act evidenc-
ing an adverse intent. This distinction between entry under a
void foreclosure sale before and after receiving a deed is advert-
ed to by the South Dakota court in an opinion6 which holds that
a mortgagee entering adversely under a deed at a void foreclosure
is given the rights of a mortgagee in possession only through an
equitable fiction created to afford equitable relief. The opinion
commends the early Minnesota rule of Rogers v. Benton that to
be a mortgagee in possession in fact the mortgagee must enter
with the consent of the mortgagor.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-CONTRACT TO SELL REAL ESTATE
-RISK OF Loss PENDING CONVEYANCE.-Suppose that in March,
A contracts to sell and B contracts to buy a piece of realty, con-
veyance to be made in May, and suppose further that in April
the buildings are destroyed. Who bears the loss ?.
1. In England' and in most jurisdictions in the United
States' the loss is placed on the vendee,' on the theory that by
"West v. Banking Co., (914) 33 S. D. 465, 486, 487, 146 N. W. 598.
See note, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 754, 757.
'It is obvious that loss caused by the negligence of either party must
be borne by that party. Lynch v. Wright, (1899) 94 Fed 703, by the
vendor; Styles v. Blume, (i895) 12 Misc. 421, 33 N. Y. S. 62o, by the
vendee; 39 Cyc. 1643.
'Poole v. Adams, (1864) 33 L. J. Ch. 639, "1o L. T. (N.S.) 287, 12 W.
R. 683; Rayner v. Preston, (i88i) 44 L. T. (N.S.) 787, 29 W. R. 547.
The early English rule seems to have been that the vendor bore the risk.
See dictum in Stent v. Bailis, (1724) 2 P. Wms. 217, 22o. The present
rule was first laid down in Paine v. Meller, (i8Ol) 6 Ves. Jr. 349. Here
the premises burned after the vendee had accepted the title, but before
a deed had been executed. The court held that since the vendee was in
equity the owner, he should bear the loss. It should be noted, however,
that in England, contrary to the custom in the United States, the vendee
prepared the deed and presented it to the vendor for execution. For this
reason, if the vendee actually accepted the title, it can well be argued that
loss occurring before the execution of the deed should fall upon him.
The rule of Paine v. Meller, as it is broadly stated, would therefore seem
unwarranted by the particular facts of the case. F6r a discussion of the
misinterpretation of the case, see 23 Yale L. J. 266-27o.
'Woodward v. McCollum and State Bank, (19o7) I6 N. D. 42, 49, III
N. W. 623; Bautz v. Kuhworth, (1869) I Mont. 133, 25 Am. Rep. 737;
Sewell v. Underhill, (igIo) 197 N. Y. I68, go N. E. 430, 27 L. R. A. (N.S.)
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virtue of the equitable doctrine of specific performance he is in
effect the owner.' It is submitted, however, that this line of rea-
'soning is not conclusive. To say that the vendee bears the loss be-
cause he is in equity the owner merely begs the question, for it
assumes the point in issue, i, e., is the vendee the owner? By
well settled rules the vendee is the owner only in case the contract
is enforceable against him. Thus the courts accepting the ma-
jority rule properly hold that the vendee does not bear the loss if
at the time of the destruction the vendor had not good title to
convey' But if a condition is implied in this connection, why is
there not also an implied condition that the subject matter of the
contract shall be in existence when the time for performance ar-
rives? If the vendee's liability is a consequence of the contract,
his liability should attach only to the extent of the vendor's com-
pliance therewith.' A promise to convey a house and lot is no
more fulfilled by conveying the lot without the house than by con-
veying nothing at all. In either case there is a failure Gf con-
sideration, and if total failure is a total defense, partial failure
should be at least a partial defense. A contract to buy land, with-
out anything further, does not, properly speaking, render the ven-
dee the "owner" in equity. This statement is not inconsistent
with a recognition of the fact that under certain conditions equity
will recognize in the vendee vested rights. But these rights dif-
fer from those of an owner to the same extent and degree as the
right to future ownership differs from present ownership.' The
two are fundamentally unlike in fact and in legal effect, but the dis-
tinction generally overlooked in the argument on behalf of the
.233 and note, 18 Ann. Cas. 795, 134 A. S. R. 863; Fouts v. FoudraS, (1912)
31 Okla 221, 12o Pac. 96o, 38 L. R. A. (N.S.) 251, 3o.Ann. Cas. 3Ol and
note; O'Brien v. Paulsen, (Ia. 1922) 186 N. W. 440; 27 R. C. L. 556; 39
Cyc 1641. Note that where the subject matter of the sale is mixed realty
and personalty, the vendor must bear the loss. Clinton v. Hope Ins. Co.,(1871) 45 N. Y. 454, 466.
'The term "vendee" is used throughout in the sense of a vendee under
an executory contract for the sale of realty.
'For a compilation of rules illustrating a vendee's equitable owner-
ship, see i Col. L. Rev. i. For adverse comment as to the application of
these rules to the question of the risk of loss, see 2 Williston, Contracts,
sec. 936.
2 Wjlliston, Contracts, sec. 932.
'The early English cases in accord with the majority rule might be
justified on the grounds that they were decided at a time when mutual
promises were considered independent. If this be true, then since a party
to a contract today cannot sue without alleging- full performance on his
part, the reason for the English rule has ceased, and the rule itself should
cease. 2 Williston, Contracts, sec. 933.
'2 Williston, Contracts, sec. 929.
ELECTION OF REMEDIES
majority rule that the vendee having the benefits of ownership
should also bear the burdens. These so-called "benefits of owner-
ship" exclude the right of possession,"° and, furthermore, in the
absence of recording acts, are entirely destroyed by the vendor's
fradulent sale to a bona fide purchaser.11 It would seem that
ownership which gives neither present possession nor guarantees
it for the future, but which all the while carries with it the risk
of loss is not the kind of ownership the ordinary vendee looks for-
ward to. It has sometimes been suggested that the majority rule
is justifiable on the theory that the vendor in possession is in effect
a mortgagee, holding his legal title for security purposes only.
But this rule does violence to the intent of the parties, and more-
over the legal rights and liabilities of a vendor in possession are
essentially different from those of a mortgagee'
II. A few jurisdictions hold that the vendor must bear the
risk until the actual conveyance of the premises.' This rule is
the same as that applied to sales of personalty, " and, while or-
dinarily correct, it is questionable in that it arbitrarily fixes the
burden of loss, like the majority rule, without regard to the cir-
cumstances of each case." It can hardly be denied that the situa-
tion might be such that before the actual conveyance of the prem-
ises the loss should properly fall on the vendee.
III. To remedy the unavoidable evils arising from the appli-
cation of either of the preceding extreme rules, a third rule, ably
'The objection to this theory is that there are practically no chance im-
provements analogous to chance destruction. 2 Williston, Contracts, sec.
941, p. 1789. But even so, some jurisdictions inconsistently charge the
vendee with the costs of improvements made by the vendor under com-
pulsion of law. King v. Ruckman, (1873) 24 N. J. Eq. 556, 566.
"Cartin v. Hammond, ( i8go) io Mont. i, 24 Pac. 627.2127 R. C. L. 562.
"This is shown by the following rules: an agreement between a mort-
gagor and a mortgagee declaring that the mortgaged property will be for-
feited in case of nonpayment will not be enforced, see Peugh v. Davis,
(1877) 96 .U. S 332, 24 L. Ed. 775; whereas an agreement between vendor
and vendee that time is of the essence will generally be enforced,- 2
Williston, Contracts, sec. 937. Furthermore, unlike a mortgagor, a vendee
is not entitled to possession or to the rents and profits. Iowa Ry. Land
Co. v. Boyle, (1912) 54 Ia. 249, 134 N. "W. 59o, 38 L. R. A. (N.S.) 42o.
See further, Kirby v. Harrison et al., (1853) 2 Ohio St. 327, 334, 59 Am.
Dec 677; 2 Williston, Contracts, see. 937.
"Wells v. Calnan, (1871) 107 Mass. 514, 9 Am. Rep. 65; Powell v.
Dayton, etc., R. Co., (1885) 12 Ore. 488, 8 Pac. 544; 27 . C. L. 557.
"Thompson v Gould, (1838) 20 Pick. (Njass.) 134, 139; 3r Cyc. 343.
"It is true that many of the cases placing the loss on the vendor are
actions at law, as distinguished froth suits in equity; yet in jurisdictions
where equitable pleadings are allowable at law, the decisions on this point,
whether made by a court of equity or law, should be the same. 2 Williston,
Contracts, sec. 934.
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championed by Professor Williston, chooses the middle ground
and puts the loss upon the party in possession." Thus, a vendee
in possession bears the risk, not however because he is the "owner"
in equity, but because he is in effect a mortgagor, the relation be-
tween the parties being the same as though the vendor had actually
given a deed and taken a mortgage back. In this situation the
objection to the mortgage theory propounded under the majority
rule is removed, for, by the transfer of possession, the parties show
an intent that the vendor should hold his legal title merely for
security," and the vendee, so long as he respects the vendor's secur-
ity title, has all the so-called "benefits of ownership."
All things considered the last rule would seem the best of the
three. It is therefore regrettable that in a recent case," where the
question arose for the first time, the court, unhampered by pre-
cedents of its own, nevertheless followed the English rule, and
put the loss on the vendee not in possession.
RECENT CASES
ACTIONs-LOCAL OR TRANSITORY-COURTS-JURISDICTIoN-NEGLIGENCE-
RIGHT TO SUE IN A FOREIGN JURISDICTION FOR INJURY TO REAL EsTATE.-
The defendant through negligence caused the destruction, by fire, of
valuable timber on property owned by the plaintiff. The property is in the
state of Washington, but the suit for damages was instituted in Idaho.
Held, that only courts of the jurisdiction wherein the land is situated can
entertain actions for trespass to realty. Taylor v. Sommers Bros. Match
Co., (Idaho, 1922) 204 Pac. 472.
The instant case is in accord with the great weight of authority, which
holds that an action for trespass to realty is local, not transitory, and
therefore cannot be brought in a foreign jurisdiction. 2 Cooley, Torts,
3rd Ed., 9oi ; notes, 26 L. R. A. (N.S.) 933, 44 L. R. A. (N.S.) 267, 268,
'Williston, The Risk of Loss, 9 Harvard L. Rev. io6; 2 Williston,
Contracts, sec. 94o. And see Good v. Jarrard, (1912) 93 S. C. 229,.239, 76
S. E. 698, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 383 and note; dissenting opinion in McGin-
ley v. Forrest, (Neb. i921) 186 N. W. 74.In criticism of this statement, it has been said: "It is submitted that
if the court of equity is justified in treating the title as if it had passed in
a case where the parties have manifested an intention that the title be re-
tained simply as security, then the same result should b,: reached when
that court, in the absence of any indication of the intelition of the parties
to the contract has, because of the rights conferred upon the vendee,
treated the vendor as holding the property simply as security." Keener,
The Burden of Loss, x Col. L. Rev. I, 5. The fallacy of this argument
lies in the fact that it assunes that the rights conferred on the vendee,
possession or no possession, warrant equity's calling the vendor's title
merely one of security.
"McGinley v. Forrest, (Neb. 1921) i86 N. W. 74.
